I argue that aesthetic properties can negatively bias our epistemic evaluations: they can make us think that communications that are actually significant or profound are banal or unimportant. Then, I argue that this observation has implications for our understanding of the value of art. Many people think their favourite artworks are valuable qua art partly because of the insights they convey—a version of a view called aesthetic cognitivism. One objection to this view highlights the difficulty of giving examples of insights (...) learnt from art—articulations of the supposed ‘insights’ often sound hopelessly banal. However, the potential for aesthetically induced epistemic underestimations undermines this objection. The aesthetic properties that articulations of insights from artworks tend to bear are likely to give a false impression of banality. So, attempts to articulate insights from artworks are not reliable evidence of the epistemic value of those works. (shrink)

Invertebrate research ethics has largely been ignored compared to the consideration of higher order animals, but more recent focus has questioned this trend. Using the robotic control of Aurelia aurita as a case study, we examine ethical considerations in invertebrate work and provide recommendations for future guidelines. We also analyze these issues for prior bioethics cases, such as cyborg insects and the 'microslavery' of microbes. However, biohybrid robotic jellyfish pose further ethical questions regarding potential ecological consequences as ocean monitoring tools, (...) including the impact of electronic waste in the ocean. After in-depth evaluations, we recommend that publishers require brief ethical statements for invertebrate research, and we delineate the need for invertebrate nociception studies to revise or validate current standards. These actions provide a stronger basis for the ethical study of invertebrates, with implications for individual, species-wide, and ecological impacts, as well as for studies in science, engineering, and philosophy. (shrink)

Barnes et al. (2025) emphasize the need for current biobanking consent models to more deeply engage participants who want to determine how their data are used. We appreciate their desire to provide par- ticipants with real-time updates on the status of their data and make the process more accessible. We addi- tionally agree with the goal of making biobanking data more private and secure. However, despite agreeing with the authors on these broader aims, we identify deep moral difficulties with their (...) article on two levels. On one level, we worry that the authors have not engaged deeply enough with some of the constituent parts of their proposal. On a different level, rather than critically examining the use of novel technological methods for managing biobank- ing data, the article instead reads as an effort by the authors to “sell” the underlying technology under the guise of an ethics paper. (shrink)

Many scholars and activists seek to eliminate “race”—the word and the concept—from our vocabulary. Their claim is clear: because science has shown that racial essentialism is false and because the idea of race has proved virulent, we should do away with the concept entirely. Michael O. Hardimon criticizes this line of thinking, arguing that we must recognize the real ways in which race exists in order to revise our understanding of its significance. Rethinking Race provides a novel answer to the (...) question “What is race?” Pernicious, traditional racialism maintains that people can be judged and ranked according to innate racial features. Hardimon points out that those who would eliminate race make the mistake of associating the word only with this view. He agrees that this concept should be jettisoned, but draws a distinction with three alternative ideas: first, a stripped-down version of the ordinary concept of race that recognizes minimal physical differences between races but does not consider them significant; second, a scientific understanding of populations with shared lines of descent; and third, an acknowledgment of “socialrace” as a separate construction. Hardimon provides a language for understanding the ways in which races do and do not exist. His account is realistic in recognizing the physical features of races, as well as the existence of races in our social world. But it is deflationary in rejecting the concept of hierarchical or defining racial characteristics. Ultimately, Rethinking Race offers a philosophical basis for repudiating racism without blinding ourselves to reality. (shrink)

ABSTRACT One way in which we may be able to legitimately determine the norms that will guide our arguments is by using meta-dialogues. Unfortunately, situations where meta-dialogues are actually needed are also often situations of power inequality so that arguers may feel that it is too risky to attempt initiating a meta-dialogue. I argue that argumentative smothering is a high risk here, and that we therefore cannot rely on meta-dialogues to solve the problems of determining argumentative norms.

There has been widespread opposition to so-called essentialism in contemporary social theory. At the same time, within contemporary analytic metaphysics, the notion of essence has been revived and put to work by neo-Aristotelians. The ‘new essentialism’ of the neo-Aristotelians opens the prospect for a new social essentialism—one that avoids the problematic commitments of the ‘old essentialism’ while also providing a helpful framework for social theorizing. In this paper, I develop a neo-Aristotelian brand of essentialism about social kinds and show how (...) it avoids the legitimate worries of social theorists. I then argue that neo-Aristotelian social kind essentialism provides a helpful framework for a wide range of projects in social ontology and feminist metaphysics, including debunking projects, descriptive inquiries, and the project of achieving social change. I further argue that an essentialist framework is more useful than a grounding framework when it comes to certain legitimate theoretical and practical purposes in social theory. (shrink)

Machine learning (ML) systems are vulnerable to performance decline over time due to dataset shift. To address this problem, experts often suggest that ML systems should be regularly updated to ensure ongoing performance stability. Some scholarly literature has begun to address the epistemic and ethical challenges associated with different updating methodologies. Thus far, however, little attention has been paid to the impact of model updating on the ML-assisted decision-making process itself. This article aims to address this gap. It argues that (...) model updating introduces a new sub-type of opacity into ML-assisted decision-making—update opacity—that occurs when users cannot understand how or why an update has changed the reasoning or behaviour of an ML system. This type of opacity presents a variety of distinctive epistemic and safety concerns that available solutions to the black box problem in ML are largely ill-equipped to address. A variety of alternative strategies may be developed or pursued to address the problem of update opacity more directly, including bi-factual explanations, dynamic model reporting, and update compatibility. However, each of these strategies presents its own risks or carries significant limitations. Further research will be needed to address the epistemic and safety concerns associated with model updating and update opacity going forward. (shrink)

The philosophical problem of free will has endured through centuries of enquiry. There is reason to believe that new factors must be integrated into the analysis in order to make progress. In the current physicalist approach, emergence and the physical limits of information representation are found to play crucial roles in the ontological dependence of volitional processes on their neural basis. The commonly invoked characterization of free will as 'being able to act differently' is shown to be problematic and is (...) reframed as a more precise explicatum conducive to formal analysis. Subsequently, it is found that the mind operates as an ontologically open system — a causal high-level entity whose dynamics resist reduction to the states of its associated low-level neural systems, even under conditions of physical closure. An affirmative stance on free will for conscious agents is outlined. (shrink)

Evolution is often characterized as a tinkerer that creates efficient but messy solutions to problems. We analyze the nature of the problems that arise when we try to explain and understand cognitive phenomena created by this haphazard design process. We present a theory of explanation and understanding and apply it to a case problem – solutions generated by genetic algorithms. By analyzing the nature of solutions that genetic algorithms present to computational problems, we show that the reason for why evolutionary (...) designs are often hard to understand is that they exhibit non-modular functionality, and that breaches of modularity wreak havoc on our strategies of causal and constitutive explanation. (shrink)

I argue that examining the explanatory power of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) offers a fruitful approach to the problem of cognitive system demarcation. Although in the discussions on HEC it has become common to refer to considerations of explanatory power as a means for assessing the plausibility of the extended cognition approach, to date no satisfying account of explanatory power has been presented in the literature. I suggest that the currently most prominent theory of explanation in the special (...) sciences, James Woodward’s contrastive-counterfactual theory, and an account of explanatory virtues building on that theory can be used to develop a systematic picture of cognitive system demarcation in the psychological sciences. A major difference between my differential influence (DI) account and most other theories of cognitive extension is the cognitive systems pluralism implied by my approach. By examining the explanatory power of competing traditions in psychological memory research, I conclude that internalist and externalist classificatory strategies are characterized by different profiles of explanatory virtues and should often be considered as complementary rather than competing approaches. This suggests a deflationary interpretation of HEC. (shrink)

In response to escalating environmental crises, this paper introduces Nature Quotient (NQ) as a distinct and essential form of intelligence that enables humans to comprehend, adapt to, and harmonize with complex natural systems. Grounded in Granular Interaction Thinking Theory (GITT), NQ is defined as the capacity to perceive, process, and organize information about ecological interconnections—thereby fostering deeper ecological consciousness and guiding sustainable behavior. The paper posits that cultivating high NQ can counteract the anthropocentric biases inherent in conventional intelligence models and (...) catalyze a socio-cultural shift from an eco-deficit paradigm to an eco-surplus culture. The conceptualization of NQ opens promising directions for interdisciplinary research, environmental education, and policy-making aimed at biodiversity conservation, climate change mitigation, and ecological resilience. Developing robust theoretical and empirical tools to measure NQ remains an urgent and necessary endeavor. (shrink)

In this note, we discuss the possibility of humansplaining, where humansplaining is, in analogy to mansplaining, a human's act of unnecessarily and unjustly explaining something to an AI agent who is an expert on that topic. We argue that, assuming a suitably developed AI which is capable of being explained to in the first place, humansplaining would be bad for similar reasons as mansplaining and that the risk one runs of engaging in it would vary depending on the explained topic (...) and in particular on whether the natures of the explainer, the explainee, or both allow them to have expertise in that area. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. Because of this new scientific understanding of our universe, the nature of miracles must be predetermined events that occur within (...) our static block universe. The predetermined static nature of our universe lends itself to the predetermined occurrence of miracles without the necessity of any intervention in time or interference with the laws of physics. Moreover, the new philosophy of superdeterminism supports the existence of a Creator God capable of predetermining the occurrence of miracles in human events. (shrink)

The axiology of theism concerns the question of whether God’s existence would be a good thing. Pro-theists say yes, and anti-theists say no. This paper extends the axiology of theism to the realm of epistemology: would God’s existence be an epistemically good thing? It concludes in favor of epistemic pro-theism.

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, many have argued that we require transformational leadership to help us face the challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4thIR). The authors propose the layered round table approach to be one response to this call to arms. Inspired by the hierarchical, systematised, impersonal, and transactional interactions of the military, the boardroom table (or traditional corporate organisational structures) has largely continued to reflect Max Weber’s bureaucratic theory of management 150 years ago. Whilst the round table has symbolised (...) inclusivity and diversity, the authors argue that it has not quite displaced the exploitative tendencies of hierarchical management styles. Whilst most board rooms have introduced the round table to encourage discussions and debate, solutions are still largely decided upon by CEOcracies or expert advisors. In this chapter, the authors aim to lift the round table from out of the sphere of the symbolic, clarify these challenges, and posit ways in overcoming them via the layered round table approach. More than a symbol of inclusion and communion, it becomes the hub of solution creation and ensures the kind of transformational leadership required to face today and tomorrow. The authors present the layered round table as the seat from which managers can build the kind of cultural change which fosters more nurturing values, far removed from the mechanistic legacy of our corporate genealogy/past. (shrink)

Political philosophy has long been criticised for its state-centricity. A recent version of this objection asserts that the discipline perpetuates a problematic methodological nationalism. Critics argue that political philosophers are widely disposed to interpret political phenomena from the perspective of the nation-state, and that this is detrimental to normative theorising. In this paper I argue that the objection to methodological nationalism should be dropped, at least in its current form. Specifically, I reconstruct three variants of the objection, and – borrowing (...) insights from the ‘hard’ sciences and Elisabeth Camp’s account of perspectives – ultimately show that methodological nationalism is not the kind of thing that can be decisively objected to in a widely-persuasive manner. Therefore, I recommend that sweeping objections to nation-state-centricity be generally replaced with traditional targeted analysis of specific claims made in specific contexts. Despite the fine-grained nature of this approach, I show that it remains a fruitful way of addressing pervasive problems in the discipline. (shrink)

I argue that no outcome is good, bad, or evaluatively neutral for anyone. My argument concerns non-comparative personal evaluative properties alone; it does not support (say) the conclusion that no outcome is better for anyone than any other outcome. First I argue that there is a sequence of outcomes with the following properties, and that the existence of such a sequence supports the conclusion that no outcome is good for anyone: (i) the first member of the sequence is good for (...) you if any outcome is good for you, (ii) any two adjacent members of the sequence are on a par for you, and (iii) the last member of the sequence is not good for you. I then defend similar arguments that no outcome is bad or evaluatively neutral for anyone. Thus, I conclude that no outcome is good, bad, or evaluatively neutral for anyone. (shrink)

The Parmenides is the locus of Plato’s theoria motus abstracti (that is, abstract kinemat-ics) for it is here that Plato gives a mereological and locational analysis of motion (First Deduc-tion: 138b7-139b3) and discusses the famous puzzle of the instant of change (Second Deduction: 156c1-157b5). But there is another scholarly very neglected text from this dialogue that provides us with great insights about Plato’s theory of change: the Fifth Deduction (160b3-163b6) and its answer to the Eleatic argument against coming-to-be. I shall (...) devote my paper to Plato’s discussion of the coming-to-be (γένεσις) of beings from what is not; first, by expounding what Plato says in the Fifth Deduction, second, by putting his theory in a bigger philosophical ecosystem (the quarrel between Eleaticism and Creationism). Then, I shall argue for two points: first, coming-to-be as described in the Fifth Deduction is, at first sight, incompatible with Plato’s account of motion given in the First Deduction; second, the logic behind the Fifth Deduction - if consistent - must be a non-classical temporal logic that restricts Leibniz’s laws of identity to some but not all properties. (shrink)

This paper elucidates some features of law that generally go overlooked in collective bargaining. Using examples from collective bargaining agreements at universities in Florida, we unearth how assumptions about the nature of law (championed by the conservative legal movement) may undermine the ability for unions to influence the material working conditions at their universities. We believe negotiators need to reject these assumptions, and embrace an approach to ‘bargaining as pedagogy,’ which emphasizes the need for faculty and administrators alike to arrive (...) at shared understandings of what the law means (be it the collective bargaining agreement, university policy, or state statute). (shrink)

According to the Divide & Conquer (DC) strategy (Fogal & Risberg 2020) moral supervenience can be partly explained by appeal to pure moral principles. Bhogal (2022) has recently argued that DC fails. A pure moral principle like Act Utilitarianism (AU) cannot explain moral supervenience because AU is not a difference-maker for moral supervenience. That is, there is nothing special about AU which explains why moral properties supervene on natural properties. On the other hand, if the proponent of DC appeals to (...) some general feature of pure moral principles (like the fact that they have a ‘bridge-law’ structure) then there is a question of what explains that feature. In this paper I do two things. First, I propose an extended DC-strategy against Bhogal’s challenge: specifically, it could be argued that the underlying metaphysics of moral principles are as such that they provide a plausible explanation of moral supervenience. To illustrate this, I consider what I take to be the most prominent accounts about the metaphysics of moral principles and I show that, prima facie, they all converge on the view that moral principles are as such that they explain moral supervenience. Secondly, I argue that the extended DC-strategy faces an interesting dilemma: it either explains the metaphysical necessity of moral principles by adopting parochial (and potentially problematic) metaphysical assumptions, or DC leads towards moral contingentism. Finally, I note that the resulting form of moral contingentism is moderate and potentially philosophically desirable. So, in this sense, one could take DC to motivate moral contingentism. (shrink)

This paper presents, and solves, a new paradox of unacceptability. Inspired by a recent argument by Bradley Armour-Garb and James Woodbridge, my generalisation of their reasoning, if valid, shows that anyone who takes any sentence whatsoever to be unacceptable is committed to contradiction. I then show how to solve the paradox, by arguing that the reasoning in question equivocates on the word ‘unacceptable’. Those who think my solution works will learn something about how (not) to reason about acceptability, with important (...) consequences for our evaluation of arguments in the philosophy of truth. Those who disagree will have a new paradox to grapple with. (shrink)

The rise of large language models (LLMs) has brought with it a robust debate about whether these machines know what they are talking about, or whether they are just bullshitting. Answering this question requires wrestling with the problem of intentionality: what are the conditions for our thoughts, beliefs, and judgments to be about the world? How can we differentiate a model that says the right thing from one that understands what it is saying? This article addresses the intentionality of LLMs (...) by revisiting Haugeland’s storied team, “the Intentionality All-Stars.” I lay out four major approaches to intentionality that are regularly applied to explain LLMs behavior—as well as their failures. Spelling out the different positions, in turn, shows that there are multiple conditions that must be met for an LLM to know what it is talking about—and the numerous ways current models fall short. (shrink)

Building on the intuitive assumption that speech acts consist of two components—a genuine act and the content of the act itself—we outline a logic for assertion and hypothesis, referred to as “logic for pragmatics.” This entry serves as an introduction to the fundamental elements of pragmatic logic.

The Frege-Geach problem is a central issue in metaethics, challenging expressivist theories to justify logical inferences involving moral expressions. Expressivists argue that moral statements express attitudes rather than truth-apt propositions, yet this position struggles with preserving logical coherence in contexts where moral claims are unasserted. Solutions to this problem include Simon Blackburn’s approach involving higher-order attitudes, Mark Schroeder’s ”being for” framework, and Allan Gibbard’s theory of factual-normative worlds. Each framework contributes insights, yet a comprehensive resolution may necessitate combining linguistic and (...) pragmatic analyses with metaethical perspectives to clarify inference patterns in expressivist reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper, I will present and defend a hybrid account of structural rationality, simultaneously accommodating what two rival accounts, wide-scopism and narrow-scopism, get right. Wide-scopism holds that moving from an incoherent state to a coherent state is always a structurally rational thing to do. Narrow-scopism holds that there are cases in which the particular way in which coherence is achieved matters to structural rationality. The hybrid account I offer here holds that these two claims are compatible and true.

In his early work Feyerabend argues that certain theories are incommensurable due to semantic variance. In this paper it is argued that Feyerabend relies on a description theory of reference in the course of his argument for incommensurability and in his analysis of the relevant kind of semantic variance. Against this it is objected that such reliance on the description theory eliminates ostensive reference determination and obscures the presence of theoretical conflict.

This essay attempts to cast light on the recent debate over whether the norm of assertion is “weak” or “strong.” I proceed somewhat indirectly, first arguing for a distinction between two classes of utterances of declarative sentences, classes that can be empirically distinguished along a number of dimensions. For example, these two kinds of utterances differ from each other in what they add to the common ground, how they are elicited, and what sorts of attitude reports they license. I suggest (...) that whether this should be understood as showing that “the norm of assertion” is weak or strong or context‐sensitive appears to be largely a terminological question about which utterances of declaratives ought to be called “assertions.” But however the terminological issue is resolved, there remain interesting questions concerning what role each type of utterance plays in our epistemic and communicative practices, and I close with some remarks bearing on this issue. (shrink)

The paper raises a quandary for the naturalist friend of truth who rejects the a priori outright. The quandary is that instances of the T-scheme are analytic, hence knowable a priori. The naturalist must either renounce their friendship with truth or soften their stance on the a priori. The paper recommends the latter option. -/- .

Dunbar’s emphasis on dyadic relationships in group formation overlooks the roles of interdependence and joint commitment in social cohesion. We challenge his premise by highlighting the importance of group-level processes, particularly where top-down group pressures like cooperative breeding and out-group threat can induce joint commitment as an alternate means to sustain group cohesion.

John Martin Fischer has long championed semicompatibilism, the view that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility even if determinism is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. Since (as Fischer agues) moral responsibility is grounded in facts about the actual sequence, it is not threatened by the Consequence Argument, which threatens only the idea that we have access to alternative sequences. This view is attractive in part because it allows us to sidestep thorny questions about the fixity of the past (...) and the fixity of the laws. But in this paper I explore two alternative ways we might be able to sidestep those thorny questions while defending a more thoroughgoing compatibilism, about both moral responsibility and free will. My alternative proposals both depend on coming to see free will, in addition to moral responsibility, as an actual-sequence notion. (shrink)

Two of life’s greatest mysteries are the phenomena of consciousness and the nature of spacetime. Herein, we use quantum entanglement as an inroad to both, developing a new “superpsychist” panpsychist theory. First, we frame and defend a position in which spacetime emerges from an aspatial, quasi-temporal, reality called “prototime.” We call this view of quantum phenomena the “Prototime Interpretation.” Then, based on our position on entanglement, we develop a new version of panpsychism, which we call “Superpsychism.” According to Superpsychism, the (...) fundamental level of physics has a more advanced form of consciousness than spacetime occupants do, in the sense that it exhibits maximal coherence, zero entropy and holistic integration of conscious states. Whereas cosmospychists like Goff (2017) and Nagasawa and Wager (2020) locate the fundamental unit of consciousness in the very big, we claim the greatest form of consciousness is found in the holistically entangled structure that is not even spatiotemporal and which underlies spacetime itself. (shrink)

The first English translation of Novalis’s unfinished notes for a universal science, Das Allgemeine Brouillon. Composed of more than 1,100 notebook entries, this is the German romantic poet-philosopher's largest theoretical work. In it, Novalis reflects on numerous aspects of human culture, including philosophy, poetry, the natural sciences, the fine arts, mathematics, mineralogy, history, and religion, and brings them all together into a "Romantic Encyclopaedia”, or what he calls a “Scientific Bible”. -/- Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia: Das Allgemeine Brouillon. (...) Edited, Translated and Introduced by David W. Wood, published by SUNY Press (State University of New York Press), Albany/N.Y., 2007, xxx + 290 pp. (shrink)

Correspondence and texts by Fichte and Schelling illuminate their thought and the trajectory of their philosophical falling out.

The Global Brain Argument contends that many of us are, or will be, part of a global brain network that includes both biological and artificial intelligences (AIs), such as generative AIs with increasing levels of sophistication. Today’s internet ecosystem is but a hodgepodge of fairly unintegrated programs, but it is evolving by the minute. Over time, technological improvements will facilitate smarter AIs and faster, higher-bandwidth information transfer and greater integration between devices in the internet-of-things. The Global Brain (GB) Argument says (...) that as these developments occur, humans will increasingly become part of one or more global brain networks. In this paper I lay out the argument and explore its implications, asking: what does this mean for the future of humanity? Is a GB here? What are the AI safety implications? Are those who are “wired in” cases of extended minds? While I cannot explore all of the implications of the argument, I hope this initial foray inspires further reflection. I believe that the future of human flourishing demands that we consider the implications of this emerging intelligence. We must study the phenomenon with care, for this intelligence may shape the future of life on Earth. (shrink)

Gupta develops a highly original and comprehensive account of the epistemic role of perceptual experience in his recent book. Among other things, Gupta holds that although we can attribute propositional content to experience, this alleged content has no crucial role to play in perceptual epistemology. He also adds that the view that experience justifies belief in its propositional content results in the view that experience grounds direct knowledge only of objects that are both metaphysically and logically distinct from ordinary external (...) objects, a view that he calls Cartesianism. Here, I pose two challenges to Gupta’s rejection of the epistemic significance of content and his contention that the propositional given view results in a form of Cartesianism. (shrink)

Huettig and Christiansen in an earlier issue argue that large language models (LLMs) are beneficial to address declining cognitive skills, such as literacy, through combating imbalances in educational equity. However, we warn that this technosolutionism may be the wrong frame. LLMs are labor intensive, are economically infeasible, and pollute the environment, and these properties may outweigh any proposed benefits. For example, poor quality air directly harms human cognition, and thus has compounding effects on educators' and pupils' ability to teach and (...) learn. We urge extreme caution in facilitating the use of LLMs, which like much of modern academia run on private technology sector infrastructure, in classrooms lest we further normalize: pupils losing their right to privacy and security, reducing human contact between learner and educator, deskilling teachers, and polluting the environment. Cognitive scientists instead can learn from past mistakes with the petrochemical and tobacco industries and consider the harms to cognition from LLMs. (shrink)

For many decades, Duhem has been considered a paradigmatic instrumentalist, and while some commentators have argued against classifying him in this way, it still seems prevalent as an interpretation of his philosophy of science. Yet such a construal bears scant resemblance to the views presented in his own works—so little, indeed, that it might be said to constitute no more than a mere phantom with respect to his actual thought. In this article, we aim to deconstruct this phantom, tracing the (...) sources of the misconceptions surrounding his ideas and pinpointing the sources and/or causes of its proliferation. We subsequently point out and discuss those elements of his philosophy that, taken together, support the view of him as a scientific realist of a sophisticated kind. Finally, we defend our own interpretation of his thought against suggestions to the effect that it is oriented towards neither instrumentalism nor scientific realism. (shrink)

One question that arises in connection with Ockhamism, and that perhaps has not yet received the attention it deserves, is how a coherent formal account of truth ascriptions can be provided by using a suitable truth predicate in the object language. We address this question and show its implications for some semantic issues that have been discussed in the literature on future contingents. Arguably, understanding how truth ascriptions work at the formal level helps to gain a deeper insight into Ockhamism (...) itself. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have shown an increasing interest in the normativity of inquiry. For example, they discuss which doxastic or epistemic state makes an inquiry permissible or impermissible. Moreover, since our inquiries are typically considered goal-directed activities that aim at answering questions, philosophers have offered general principles to capture their instrumental normativity. However, it is notable that these principles – being general – lack specificity: They do not tell us how we should specifically behave to conduct an effective inquiry. The primary (...) goal of this paper is to provide a first formulation of more specific norms of inquiry. To further this goal, I will consider the prominent theory of conversation promoted by Roberts (1996, 2006), which describes conversation as an instance of inquiry. Based on this perspective and the idea that Grice’s maxims (1975) individuate the norms of effective conversation, I will reformulate Gricean maxims in zetetic norms and argue for their intuitive appeal in regulating our inquiries. Moreover, I will point out how these “Gricean zetetic norms” can be fruitful in opening new lines of research about the zetetic domain. In particular, I will show how they can be used to identify and ground the existence of some zetetic virtues – virtues of inquiry: Zetetic parsimony, reliability, focus, and lucidity. Finally, I discuss how compatible these “Gricean zetetic virtues” are with the intellectual virtues we can find in the epistemological literature. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that successful evidence-based policy should rely on two kinds of evidence: statistical and mechanistic. The former is held to be evidence that a policy brings about the desired outcome, and the latter concerns how it does so. Although agreeing with the spirit of this proposal, we argue that the underlying conception of mechanistic evidence as evidence that is different in kind from correlational, difference-making or statistical evidence, does not correctly capture the role that information about (...) mechanisms should play in evidence-based policy. We offer an alternative account of mechanistic evidence as information concerning the causal pathway connecting the policy intervention to its outcome. Not only can this be analyzed as evidence of difference-making, it is also to be found at any level and is obtainable by a broad range of methods, both experimental and observational. Using behavioral policy as an illustration, we draw the implications of this revised understanding of mechanistic evidence for debates concerning policy extrapolation, evidence hierarchies, and evidence integration. (shrink)

We review the most prominent modeling approaches in social epistemology aimed at understand- ing the functioning of epistemic communities and provide a philosophy of science perspective on the use and interpretation of such simple toy models, thereby suggesting how they could be integrated with conceptual and empirical work. We highlight the need for better integration of such models with relevant findings from disciplines such as social psychology and organization studies.

Theorists have raised worries about conceptual inflation for more than three decades. These worries have been frequently expressed about ‘racism’ and ‘racist’, as well as other politically contested terms. However, these theorists have not always been clear about what conceptual inflation is or why it is worrisome. By disentangling different threads of these conceptual inflation critiques, we construct a taxonomy of different types of conceptual inflation. We start with a brief history of conceptual inflation critiques, with a focus on the (...) terms ‘racism’ and ‘racist’. We then separate out descriptive and normative components of conceptual inflation critiques. Focusing on the descriptive component, we emphasize that it is about meaning and not frequency of use, and we clarify different aspects about variation in the meaning of these terms that has concerned these theorists. We distinguish between two aspects of meaning, extension and intensity, and two kinds of variation, synchronic and diachronic. Our taxonomy reveals what kind of evidence would support or challenge different types of conceptual inflation critiques. (shrink)

We propose a novel reading of Descartes' views on the nature of pain, thirst, and hunger: imperativism. According to imperativism, rather than (exclusively) having intentional contents individuated by a set of correctness conditions specifying the way the world is, pain thirst, and hunger have contents individuated by satisfaction conditions, which specify the way the world ought to be. Unlike representationalist treatments, the imperativist reading satisfies the unique health-preserving role Descartes sets out for pain, thirst, and hunger, without inflating his austere (...) metaphysics of res extensa. (shrink)

In the Fifth Meditation Descartes considers the problem of knowledge preservation : the challenge of accounting for the diachronic certainty of perfect knowledge [scientia]. There are two general solutions to PKP in the literature: the regeneration solution and the infallible memory solution. While both readings pick up on features of Descartes’ considered view, I argue that they ultimately fall short. Salvaging pieces from both readings and drawing from Descartes’ virtue theory, I argue on textual and systematic grounds for a dispositionalist (...) solution. On this view, the diachronic certainty of scientia is achieved through virtuous habits of belief. (shrink)

The papers which follow were presented at an international conference which was held in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest in March 1992. The conference, the first in a series of Monist Colloquia sponsored by the Hegeler Institute, was directed by G. M. Tamas and J. C. Nyiri, both of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. -/- _Contents_ -/- J. C. NYIRI: Tradition and Bureacratic Lore: Lessons from Hungary TIBOR HAJDU: Ideology and Technology: A Comment on Nyfri G.M. TAMAS: Conservatism, (...) Philosophy and Eastern Europe E. GELLNER: An Ideological Might-Have-Been WOJCIECH ZELANIEC: Philosophy and Ideology: The Case of Poland JAN WOLENSKI: Marxism and the Professionalisation of Philosophy JAN PAVLIK: Philosophy, “Parallel Polis” and Revolution: The Case of Czechoslovakia WILLIAM McBRIDE and IVANKA RAYNOVA: Visions From the Ashes: Philosophical Life in Bulgaria from 1945 to 1992 EDWARD M. SWIDERSKI: The Crisis of Continuity in Post-Soviet Russian Philosophy BARRY SMITH: The New European Philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper contributes to the debate about the strawman fallacy. It is the received view that strawmen are employed to fool not the arguer whose argument they distort, but instead a third party, an audience. I argue that strawmen that fool their victims exist and are an important variation of the strawman fallacy because of their special perniciousness. I show that those who are subject to hermeneutical lacunae or who have since forgotten parts of justifications they have provided earlier (...) are especially vulnerable to falling for strawmen aimed at their own positions or arguments. Adversarial argumentation provides especially fertile ground for strawmen that fool their own victims, but cooperative argumentation is no fail-safe protection from them either. (shrink)

I have had extraordinary teachers who gave me far more than I was owed. Those gifts put a distinctive normative pressure upon me; I cannot ever repay the the gifts that were given me, but I can, and should, pay them forward. Not to do so would be a normative failing. Thinkers as varied as Jesus, Benjamin Franklin, Emerson, and Paul Erdős ​(of Erdős number fame) all seem to agree that we face some kind of injunction to pay it forward. (...) This paper asks why: why would receipt of an undeserved benefit from one party generate any normative pressure to do likewise for a third party? I show that attempts to explain the phenomenon of paying it forward via an appeal to beneficence, gratitude, or fairness all fail, and so we must look elsewhere. In bipolar relationships, like friendships, we are subject to norm of balance or harmony; when the other relates to me an especially generous way, I should in turn live up to that example and so relate back. Balance in bipolar relationships is a diachronic norm—healthy relationships sustain and thrive on local imbalances—but a relationship which remains one-sided is thereby flawed. I argue that so, too, are we subject to a norm of balance across generations. When we cannot or should not pay a gift back and achieve balance within a bipolar relationship, we can instead pay that gift forward and achieve balance across a larger time horizon. For me not to go above and beyond for my students would leave that broader multi-generational relationship—stretching from my teacher to me to my students—imbalanced with me at its normative focal point. In this paper I articulate and defend an intergenerational balance norm, showing that paying it forward arises within multi-generational relationships like that connecting me, my teachers, and my students—even though it does not always seem like that on the surface. Having defended an account of inter-generational balance, I ask to whom one can pay it forward, arguing that one can successfully achieve inter-generational balance with recipients quite different from one's initial giver(s). The upshot: among the tasks of responding to deep asymmetries and dependencies in our lives is the maintenance and forging of multi-generational relationships within which we can achieve an ideal of balance.​. (shrink)

Rethinking and valuing the Eucharist’s polyvalence of meanings that we can find in Tradition (as sacrament of healing, nourishment, and perfection), the article shows that there are no biblical-theological reasons to deny the access to Eucharistic communion in the liturgical celebration to a baptized person, in whatever irregular situation he or she may be. In the light of the theology of mercy and Jesus’ ways of action, such doctrinal updating allows for a more harmonious and inclusive resolution of some pastoral (...) issues, while safeguarding the systematic reason for the sacrament in relation to penance. (shrink)

As global temperatures approach critical thresholds, debate intensifies over optimal climate mitigation strategies. This comparative analysis evaluates technological interventions (carbon capture, geoengineering) against nature-based solutions (forest restoration, wetland conservation) through four criteria: effectiveness, scalability, environmental impacts, and socio-political implications. Our findings reveal that while technological approaches promise precise carbon removal, they face significant limitations including prohibitive costs, limited deployment, and potential ecological disruption. Conversely, nature-based solutions demonstrate superior cost-efficiency, deliver multiple ecosystem benefits, and enable decentralized implementation with community engagement. Analysis (...) suggests these disparities stem from what we term an "eco-deficit culture" prioritizing proprietary technologies over public ecological goods, systematically marginalizing Indigenous and Local Knowledge systems despite their demonstrated effectiveness. We propose transitioning to an "eco-surplus" paradigm through financial reforms, governance restructuring, and knowledge reintegration. This shift represents not merely a technical adjustment but a fundamental realignment of human-environment relationships, wherein climate action enhances rather than merely sustains ecological health. (shrink)

In the philosophical debate about scientific progress, several authors appeal to a distinction between what constitutes scientific progress and what promotes it (e.g., Bird, 2008; Rowbottom, 2008; Dellsén, 2016). However, the extant literature is almost completely silent on what exactly it is for scientific progress to be promoted. Here I provide a precise account of progress promotion on which it consists, roughly, in increasing expected progress. This account may be combined with any of the major theories of what constitutes scientific (...) progress, such as the truthlikeness, problem-solving, epistemic, and noetic accounts. However, I will also suggest that once we have this account of progress promotion up and running, some accounts of what constitutes progress become harder to motivate by the sorts of considerations often adduced in their favor, while others turn out to be easier to defend against common objections. (shrink)

This chapter introduces empirical network analysis (ENA) as a toolbox to complement other methods in philosophy of science. It aims to provide a hands-on introduction to ENA for philosophers of science and to discuss the usefulness of ENA for addressing questions of interest to philosophy of science. We accompany our account by an in-depth consideration of two examples of ENA to reflect not only on the potentials but also on the challenges of ENA. The chapter concludes by outlining skills required (...) for concrete applications and pointing to several resources that can be consulted to acquire those skills. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have recently started to discuss the role of scientific methods for their field. Those tendencies have immediate methodological implications for Integrated History and Philosophy Science (&HPS) as an area that contributes to philosophy of science while drawing heavily on historical case studies. This paper addresses the questions whether and if so in which way scientific methods can be useful for research in &HPS by discussing the usefulness of one such method, namely network analysis. By focusing on the (...) example of model transfer in science, I argue that network analysis is particularly useful for doing research in &HPS because it allows for addressing a set of methodological issues arising from the use of case studies. More specifically, my claim is that network analysis can enhance the core functions of case studies in &HPS, namely those of concept generation, of concept refinement, and of empirical justification of concepts. While I discuss the advantages of network analysis for &HPS, I close by cautioning that it cannot replace more traditional philosophical methods. Rather, network analysis must rely on them to fully develop its potentials. (shrink)

Violent video games are not always or perhaps even typically used for recruitment by extremist groups, even when extremists produce their own games. Nevertheless, when not used for recruitment, they have a clear propaganda function, including that of “normalising” extremism behind the façade of a familiar first-person shooter format. There is some evidence that success in violent video games may distinguish players and make them liable to in-person approaches from extremists on game-adjacent platforms. These approaches may radicalize players who are (...) looking for social connection, and may, in a few cases, turn them into real-world fighters. Extremist games also give people with extremist inclinations the opportunity to act them out online. The transition from game violence to real violence is not guaranteed, but extremists encourage it, sometimes through tactical communication over gaming devices, sometimes by using game audio and text for the expression of hate. There are strong and obvious moral objections to this use of games and game-adjacent platforms, and to enlisting games for the common extremist objective of weakening liberal democracy. (shrink)

This chapter argues that moral ignorance implies lack of care of morally relevant considerations as predicted by quality-of-will theories of responsibility, and thus moral ignorance, as opposed to circumstantial ignorance, does not excuse wrongdoing. A new attributionist framework for responsibility for attitudes is presented and supplemented with empirical studies on selective attention to explain the connection between caring and belief formation. The framework is then used to shed light on putative counterexamples to culpable moral ignorance by introducing attentional priority structures (...) that help to distinguish between genuine lack of care as a moral mistake, and nonculpable carelessness that undermines something the agent actually cares about. The chapter ends with a definition of adequate caring and a response to the objection from moral heroism. (shrink)

This editorial explores the overlooked, yet compelling, intersection of sport and psychoanalysis. While sport is often viewed as a realm of physicality, competition, and entertainment, psychoanalysis reveals its deeper psychological significance. Sport functions as a site where unconscious desires, fantasies, and social tensions are enacted, challenging the notion that it exists beyond critical thought. This piece introduces several key themes, including the paradox of sport’s (in)significance—its simultaneous frivolity and profound cultural weight—along with the emotional and symbolic investments that shape fan (...) devotion and identity. Sport is presented as a microcosm of broader societal contradictions, where issues like failure, transgression, and unending desire take on heightened meaning. Furthermore, the editorial argues that sport does not merely invite psychoanalytic critique but also poses challenges to psychoanalytic thought itself, particularly regarding embodiment, rule-breaking, and fandom. By recognizing sport as a concentrated form of life, this introduction calls for further scholarly inquiry into its unconscious dynamics. The Sport and Psychoanalysis section welcomes original research and critical reviews on these intersections, emphasizing the necessity of taking sport seriously—not despite its absurdities, but because of them. (shrink)

Is acceptance an act or a state? Jonathan Cohen is often seen as a proponent of the view that acceptance is a mental act. In contrast, Michael Bratman claims that acceptance is a mental state. This paper argues that the evidence supports a more subtle approach. Linguistic intuitions about the lexical aspect of the verb 'accept' support the view that there is an act of acceptance and a state of acceptance. It is shown that 'accept' is polysemous between a non-stative (...) and a stative sense. In addition to its evident stative sense, 'accept' has a non-stative "agentive achievement" sense which denotes the essentially intentional action of adopting the state of acceptance. Ultimately, the paper returns to Jonathan Cohen's view of acceptance and argues that it is more charitable to attribute to him the view that to accept is to adopt the state of acceptance. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the Dialogues as a text that formulates and criticises a particular argument for design (‘the argument for design’). After presenting the relevant material from the Dialogues, I consider the strengths and weaknesses of the formulation of the argument that is the object of Hume’s criticisms, and set out what I take to be the full range of criticisms that Hume makes of it. I then assess the strength of these criticisms, paying particular attention to writers—e.g. (...) Paley, Reid, Dawkins, and Hawthorne and Isaacs—who have claimed that Hume’s objections to ‘the argument for design’ are weak or ineffectual. Next, I consider the originality of Hume’s critique of ‘the argument for design’; I argue that, on the evidence that I have considered, Hume deserves most of the credit for the objections to ‘the argument for design’ in the Dialogues. I conclude with some brief remarks about the relative importance of the success of the criticisms of ‘the argument for design’ to the overall project of the Dialogues. (shrink)

This book empirically investigates the nature of time biases. Many philosophers think that it is rationally permissible to prefer a life that is overall worse to one that is overall better, as long the badness of that life lies in the past rather than the future. These philosophers think that it is rationally permissible to be time biased. Time biased individuals differently value the wellbeing of their various selves in virtue of where those selves are located in time. This book (...) focuses on three key kinds of time bias: near, present, and future bias. It presents a rich picture of the conditions under which we display these biases, and it outlines several psychological explanations for them. It then uses this new empirical research we conducted to inform arguments regarding the normative status of these biases. At its heart it considers the question: does having time biased preferences of one sort or another make us better off or worse off? And it uses the answers to these questions to inform our theorizing about whether we have reason either to have, or to avoid having, such preferences. (shrink)

Yogācāra is a tradition of Buddhist philosophy that made important contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, and logic. While contemporary philosophers have engaged with these aspects of Yogācāra, few authors have explored the implications of Yogācāra for moral theory. In this paper, I aim to fill this gap by constructing an argument for impartial benevolence or compassion that draws on the resources of the Yogācāra tradition. According to an influential interpretation of Yogācāra, ultimate reality consists in the flow of perceptions and experience, (...) empty of the subject-object duality. I argue that, if this understanding of ultimate reality is correct, then we are unable to individuate streams of consciousness from one another. Yet I contend that there is an intrinsic normative distinction between my suffering and the suffering of others only if we can individuate streams of consciousness. Thus, there is not an intrinsic normative distinction between my suffering and the suffering of others. It follows from this conclusion that the suffering of all beings should be impartially prevented without distinction. I suggest that this argument can help explain how the impartial compassion of bodhisattvas flows from their insight into the nature of reality. (shrink)

Affirmative action is typically presumed to apply to recruitment but never lay-offs. Policies of affirmative action which only apply to recruitment are known as entry initiatives whilst exit initiatives involve lay-offs. In this paper, I challenge the status quo presumption against mixed exit initiatives which involve both lay-offs and preferential recruitment. Assuming that we have reasons to enact affirmative action initiatives whenever doing so promotes equality of opportunity, I strengthen the case for mixed exit initiatives by showing how, in at (...) least some cases, the relevant initiatives will be likely to provide a greater reduction in inequalities of opportunity both within and across different birth cohorts. I consider various objections to exit initiatives as I construe them and argue that none of them are immediately decisive such that the status quo presumption is justified. I conclude by gesturing towards the plausibility of the initiatives discussed and other policies which merit further consideration. (shrink)

Researchers working on rodent in maze studies claim that organisms use distal (far) and proximal (near) visual cues differently. I characterize the dominant working definitions researchers use for distal and proximal cues, where distal cues sit beyond an experimental apparatus (like a maze) and proximal cues sit within. Then, I present a problem: the relevant experimental apparatuses are confined to labs and cannot be used to study real-life navigation behaviors like long-distance migration. It follows that the working definitions do not (...) identify difference makers beyond those settings and do not allow for claims about distal and proximal cues to play explanatory or predictive roles for real-life navigation. Despite this, I argue that researchers should continue to treat these as working definitions for concepts that work more generally in natural environments. This calls for some conceptual engineering however, since the more generally useful concepts of “proximal” and “distal” are not well-defined. To remedy this, I present more general, ecologically valid definitions in terms of neural information about visual cues. (shrink)

This book is a feminist analysis of Greek myth and tragedy that reimagines the structures of Freudian theory. The objective of this analysis is political—by revealing the structures that undergird patriarchal oppression, feminist thinkers can work to transform these symbolic constellations through the work of sabotage, parody, and imagination. Jessica Elbert Decker attempts here to read Freudian theory through a wider lens of Ancient Greek culture, since our contemporary philosophical and social culture has inherited many of its symbolic structures (e.g., (...) patriarchy, binary thinking). The major argument of the book is that our Western philosophical, social, and symbolic systems are, as they were in the Ancient Greek world, suffused with a set of values that reflect one version of masculinity and androcentrism, and that those values are destructive to human beings as well as the non-human world, including other beings. -/- . (shrink)

The authors of this essay challenge the notion that “philosophy” is irredeemably Eurocentric by providing a series of personal, professional, and pedagogical reflections on their experience in a new graduate seminar on “Indigenous philosophy.” The authors—a graduate student, professor, and Indigenous course-facilitator—share in the fashion of “Indigenous storywork,” as outlined by Stó:lō pedagogue Jo-Ann Archibald. We begin with the instructor and how he was personally challenged to re-evaluate his roots and philosophical praxis in spite of his experience teaching over several (...) decades. The second section describes a student experience and how they measured the exigencies of decolonization against the esteem that their family holds for Canada’s brand of multiculturalism. Finally, we turn to the Indigenous seminar facilitator and his skepticism over whether the course truly constituted decolonized, or “landed,” pedagogy. Throughout, the authors ask about the demands of decolonization and how philosophical pedagogy may center Indigenous futurity. (shrink)

Imagining a future world in which people no longer die provides a helpful tool for understanding our present ethical views. It becomes evident that the cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, and courage are options for reasonable people rather than rational requirements. On the assumption that the medical means to immortality are not universally available, even justice becomes detached from theories that tie the supposed virtue to the protection of human rights. Several stratagems are available for defending a categorical right to (...) life under these circumstances, but none is compelling. Justice and human rights should therefore be understood as social conventions whose stability depends upon rejecting a tyranny of the immortals in favour of cultural traditions that connect rights and liberties with the means for their enjoyment. (shrink)

This paper presents a phenomenological analysis of shame in social networks. Initially, I examine Sartre’s (1956) account of the look and shame along with Dolezal’s (2017) reinterpretation. I then explore how shame is negotiated in online interactions arguing that, in social networking systems (SNSs), shame is banned. Since subjects are constantly visible when posting content, they tend to share material that minimizes the risk of shame’s thunderstruck. Yet, this shameless self-presentation raises complex phenomenological intricacies regarding personal identity and self-identification: in (...) SNSs individuals strive for self-completion in posts, attempting to solve their otherwise irresolvable self-individuation process. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Perfume has not received much philosophical attention. I discuss a feature of perfume that partly contributes to this neglect: the pervasive changes that perfumes undergo. These changes are much more comprehensive than the changes that characterize other aesthetic objects, and we might think that perfume is, as a result, impossibly subjective and private an aesthetic object. I identify two categories of change that raise this worry: changes that happen to a scented liquid itself and changes that happen to perfumes (...) on bodies. In both cases, the appreciative practices for perfume take a collaborative approach to change and thereby help establish a public, shared aesthetic object. Change remains distinctive of perfume and becomes central to appreciation, but without becoming an obstacle to aesthetic experience. (shrink)

How is it that individuals who deny experiencing visual imagery nonetheless perform normally on tasks which seem to require it? This puzzle of aphantasia has perplexed philosophers and scientists since the late nineteenth century. Contemporary responses include: (i) idiosyncratic reporting, (ii) faulty introspection, (iii) unconscious imagery, and (iv) complete lack of imagery combined with the use of alternative strategies. None offers a satisfying explanation of the full range of first-person, behavioural and physiological data. Here, I diagnose the puzzle of aphantasia (...) as arising from the mistaken assumption that variation in imagery is well-captured by a single ‘vividness’ scale. Breaking with this assumption, I defend an alternative account which elegantly accommodates all the data. Crucial to this account is a fundamental distinction between visual-object and spatial imagery. Armed with this distinction, I argue that subjective reports and objective measures only testify to the absence of visual-object imagery, whereas imagery task performance is explained by preserved spatial imagery which goes unreported on standard ‘vividness’ questionnaires. More generally, I propose that aphantasia be thought of on analogy with agnosia, as a generic label for a range of imagery deficits with corresponding sparing. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The philosophy of superdeterminism is a Western philosophy that disproves the foundations of Eastern philosophy. Without cause and effect in (...) physics, the Eastern philosophical concepts of karma, reincarnation, impermanence, interconnectedness, non-duality, and individual freedom are false. There is simply no basis in scientific fact under Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism to accept Eastern philosophy as true. (shrink)

This study examines employee satisfaction with HRM (Human Capital Management) practices in the Cebu City, Philippines' business process outsourcing (BPO) industry. Employing a descriptive-correlational methodology, the study explores important domains such as organizational socialization, work-life balance, adoption of Human Resource Information Systems (HRIS), labor-management relations, observance of due process, employee morale, and talent management. Significant differences in employee satisfaction levels are observed depending on demographic factors such as age, gender, civil status, educational attainment, and length of service, according to data (...) gathered from 370 employees, including both rank-and-file and management employees. The results show that compared to rank-and-file employees, whooften report moderate levels of satisfaction, management employees show lower levels of satisfaction, especially regardinglabor-management relations and work-life balance. The study emphasizes the necessity of customized HCM methods that consider demographic differences, implying that a one-size-fits-all approachmight not be sufficient to meet the different demands of a contemporary workforce. It is advised that more research be done to investigate longitudinal viewpoints and qualitative insights into HCM satisfaction. By implementing focused HR initiatives, BPO companies may improve retention, increase employee satisfaction, and cultivate a more productive team. (shrink)

Large Language Models are built on the so-called distributional semantic approach to linguistic meaning that has the distributional hypothesis at its core. The distributional hypothesis involves a holistic conception of word meaning: the meaning of a word depends upon its relations to other words in the model. A standard objection to holism is the charge of instability: any change in the meaning properties of a linguistic system (a human speaker, for example) would lead to many changes or a complete change (...) in the entire system. We examine whether the instability objection poses a problem for distributional models of meaning. First, we distinguish between distinct forms of instability that these models could exhibit, and argue that only one such form is relevant for understanding the relation between instability and communication: what we call differential instability. Differential instability is variation in the relative distances between points in a space, rather than variation in the absolute position of those points. We distinguish differential and absolute instability by constructing two of our own smaller language models. We demonstrate the two forms of instability by showing these models change as the corpora they are constructed from increase in size. We argue that the instability that these models display is constrained by the structure and scale of relationships between words, such that the resistance to change for a word is roughly proportional to its frequent and consistent use within the language system. The differential instability that language models exhibit allows for productive forms of meaning change while not leading to the problems raised by the instability objection. (shrink)

The possibility of gunk has famously been used by Schaffer (2010) to argue in favour of priority monism. In this paper, we present and explore different principled ways of being a priority pluralist in gunky worlds, thus weakening, if not deflecting, the gunk threat to pluralism.

Among theories of vagueness, supervaluationism stands out for its non–truth functional account of the logical connectives. For example, the disjunction of two atomic statements that are not determinately true or false can, itself, come out either true or indeterminate, depending on its content—a consequence several philosophers find problematic. Smith (2016) turns this point against supervaluationism most pressingly, arguing that truth functionality is essential to any adequate model of truth. But this conclusion is too strong. Here, I argue that the problem (...) with standard forms of supervaluationism is not the failure of truth functionality per se, but rather that they lack the structural resources necessary to algorithmically assign truth values to sentences based on their respective subject matters. However, recent developments of supervaluationism, which draw upon the cognitive science framework of conceptual spaces, resolve this issue. By incorporating conceptual information directly into their model-theoretic representations of the subject matters of sentences, these newer frameworks retain sensitivity to conceptual relations while providing consistent, content-based valuations of truth. Hence, their lack of truth functionality is nothing to worry about. (shrink)

Model organisms (MO) are widely used in neuroscience to study brain processes, behavior, and the biological foundation of human diseases. However, the use of MO has also been criticized for low reliability and insufficient success rate in the development of therapeutic approaches, because the success of MO use also led to overoptimistic and simplistic applications, which sometimes resulted in wrong conclusions. Here, we develop a conceptual framework of MO to support scientists in their practical work and to foster discussions about (...) their power and limitations. For this purpose, we take advantage of concepts developed in the philosophy of science and adjust them for practical application by neuroscientists. We suggest that MO can be best understood as tools that are used to gain information about a group of species or a phenomenon in a species of interest. These learning processes are made possible by some properties of MO, which facilitate the process of acquisition of understanding or provide practical advantages, and the possibility to transfer information between species. However, residual uncertainty in the reliability of information transfer remains, and incorrect generalizations can be side-effects of epistemic benefits, which we consider as representational and epistemic risks. This suggests that to use MO most effectively, scientists should analyze the similarity relation between the involved species, weigh advantages and risks of certain epistemic benefits, and invest in carefully designed validation experiments. Altogether, our analysis illustrates how scientists can benefit from philosophical concepts for their research practice. (shrink)

The rapid advancements in AI technology have raised critical questions about its impact on end-of-life care. While much of the debate focuses on AI’s potential to predict the preferences of incapacitated patients, little attention has been given to its direct application in delivering lethal drugs at a patient’s request. This contribution explores this underexamined issue, arguing that AI is a game-changer in assisted dying. The paper is structured in three parts. The first explains how AI can be effectively applied to (...) the assisted dying process. The second establishes terminological clarity, contending that the direct use of AI should not be classified as either assisted dying or euthanasia, but rather as a distinct category: AI-Assisted Suicide (AIAS). To support this claim, I examine the moral and legal responsibility associated with AI in such procedures. The third part evaluates AIAS through the lens of the key arguments regarding the moral superiority of assisted suicide over euthanasia and vice versa, concluding that AIAS appears preferable from both perspectives. Ultimately, I argue that AIAS should not merely be seen as an extension of existing assisted dying methods but, wherever feasible, as a replacement, since it effectively addresses several ongoing ethical and practical concerns in the end-of-life debate. This conclusion is particularly relevant to legislative frameworks and policymaking in end-of-life care. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the ethical dimensions of same-sex reproduction achieved through epigenome editing—an innovative and transformative technique. For the first time, I analyse the potential normativity of this disruptive approach for reproductive purposes, focusing on its implications for lesbian couples seeking genetically related offspring. Epigenome editing offers a compelling solution to the complex ethical challenges posed by traditional gene editing, as it sidesteps genome modifications and potential long-term genetic consequences. The focus of this article is to systematically analyse (...) the bioethical issues related to the use of epigenome editing for same-sex reproduction. I critically assess the ethical acceptability of epigenome editing with reproductive purposes from multiple angles, considering harm perspectives, the comparison of ethical issues related to gene and epigenome editing, and feminist theories. This analysis reveals that epigenome editing emerges as an ethically acceptable means for lesbian couples to have genetically related children. Moreover, the experiments of a reproductive use of epigenome editing discussed in this article transcend bioethics, shedding light on the broader societal implications of same-sex reproduction. It challenges established notions of biological reproduction and prompts a reevaluation of how we define the human embryo, while poses some issues in the context of gender self-identification and family structures. In a world that increasingly values inclusivity and diversity, this article aims to reveal a progressive pathway for reproductive medicine and bioethics, as well as underscores the need for further philosophical research in this emerging and fertile domain. (shrink)

I show that Hanoch Ben-Yami's so-called QUantified ARgument Calculus (QUARC) can be extended to what I call QUARC+ which I show to be intertranslatable with a version of first-order logic in which unary predicates are non-empty. Given this result, I show that QUARC+ is complete, propose an axiomatization of QUARC, and discuss the resulting expressive limitation of QUARC.

Ground physicalism is the view that higher-level properties, such as phenomenal and normative properties, are fully grounded in the fundamental physical properties. Like other non-identity physicalists, ground physicalists face the causal exclusion problem. In this paper, I introduce a new worry for the ground physicalist: the metaphysical exclusion problem. According to the metaphysical exclusion problem, there is something deeply problematic about certain properties having more than one full ground. Furthermore, the causal and metaphysical exclusion problems are shown to work together (...) to create the strengthened exclusion problem, which is significantly more difficult to resist than the causal exclusion problem alone. I then set out a solution to the strengthened exclusion problem that draws on the underexplored notion of indeterministic grounding. I conclude that the ability of indeterministic grounding to solve the strengthened exclusion problem provides us with a new reason to accept indeterministic ground physicalism. (shrink)

Controlling defects in educational policies established by the state is a formidable challenge. The state invariably believes that the solution lies in developing and improving educational outcomes. However, evaluating and monitoring these outcomes is not a straightforward process that unfolds over a year or two; it requires a span of 14–16 years, encompassing two years of preschool, 12 years of basic and secondary education, and four years of university education. Despite this extensive period, the discovery of “the quality of educational (...) policies” and subsequently “the quality of education” often proves elusive, amounting to mere rhetoric without tangible impact. In the realm of educational philosophy, drawing upon Immanuel Kant’s Enlightenment principles from December 1784 emerges as both necessary and urgent. This approach could guide us back to the foundational infrastructure and core principles of learning design, where reason and critical thought commence a critique of current educational policies in any context. With greater freedom, this enables the innovation of new concepts. Traditional education policies rendered obsolete across generations, bear striking resemblance to the religious institutions that Kant, along with scholars before him during the Dark Ages, found constraining. The critique of existing educational frameworks and the advocacy for freedom and autonomy in learning draw on the foundational work of Heckman, James and Carneiro, Pedro, (2003), who delve into human capital policy, suggesting that education systems need to be more responsive to individual needs and potential (Heckman & Carneiro, 2003). The paramount question arises: Have traditional education policies succeeded in making students subservient to their systems, structures, and models, burdened with theories of educational reform and development? It is evident that from early childhood through the stages of basic and secondary education, students are deprived of the choice in systems, structures, and curricula that suit them best. This limitation extends to university education, which is contingent upon high school grades and reliant on inadequately designed, intimidating examinations. Furthermore, it is ineffectively tethered to public policies, socio-economic conditions, and linguistic competencies (as determined by TOEFL, IELTS, etc.), or international assessments (e.g., PISA). The focus on the individual — his or her abilities, skills, aspirations, hobbies, and concerns — remains conspicuously absent from the calculus of all educational policy considerations. This research endeavors to revisit foundational questions: Why do societies necessitate education initially, followed by policies governing it? It then delves deeper into examining the relationships between educational policies and the future job market, which remains ambiguous and unknown. Keywords : Enlightenment, Educational Policies, Kantian Philosophy, Critical Thinking, Human Capital, Strategic Insight, Artificial Intelligence, Educational Reform, Lifelong Learning, Global Citizenship, Technological Revolution, Equity in Education, Educational Philosophy, Intellectual Freedom, Skill Development, Inclusive Education. (shrink)

This Element offers an opinionated and selective introduction to philosophical issues concerning the metaphysics of color. The opinion defended is that colors are objective features of our world; objects are colored, and they have those colors independent of how they are experienced. It is a minority opinion. Many philosophers thinking about color experience argue that perceptual variation, the fact that color experiences vary from observer to observer and from viewing condition to viewing condition, makes objectivism untenable. Many philosophers thinking about (...) colors and science argue that colors are ontologically unnecessary; nothing to be explained requires an appeal to colors. A careful look at arguments from perceptual variation shows that those arguments are not compelling, and especially once it is clear how to individuate colors. Moreover, a careful look at scientific explanations shows that colors are explanatorily essential. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

Andreotta and Winokur provide an overview of “transparency-theoretic” approaches to self-knowledge, drawing largely on the formative influences of Gareth Evans, Richard Moran, and their critical interlocutors. Transparency-theoretic accounts of self-knowledge state that one must, or can, look outward at the world in order to know something about one’s mind (and perhaps other aspects of oneself). Some traditional objections and limitations for transparency-theoretic accounts of self-knowledge are identified. Subsequently a brief overview of the 13 chapters in this volume are provided, each (...) of which scrutinize, clarify, or expand upon key aspects of transparent self-knowledge. (shrink)

Why should you inquire for yourself as a novice in a domain of inquiry when, for most questions within most domains, there are established experts to consult instead? In the face of this question, recent discussants of “autonomous-yet-novice” inquiry have sought to defend its epistemic value for the inquirer. Here I argue that autonomous-yet-novice inquiry can also be epistemically beneficial for agents other than the inquirer herself. Paradigm cases are those in which one agent improves her zetetic skills or virtues (...) through an encounter or interaction with a more skillful or virtuous autonomous-yet-novice inquirer. (shrink)

Profiling, often perceived as an art rather than a science, has had its legitimacy as an epistemic tool in legal inquiry questioned due to critiques concerning the reliability of statistics and other investigative techniques employed in the profiling process. However, substantial evidence indicates that profiling effectively expedites investigations by examining facts and characteristics common to specific criminal activities, such as serial murder and drug trafficking. In this article, we present a novel defense of profiling's scientific validity in legal inquiries, emphasizing (...) its crucial role in the judicial process of sexual crimes. Section 1 provides a concise introduction to profiling, laying the groundwork for the subsequent discussion. In Section 2, we argue that profiling should be recognized as a science by drawing on the epistemology of imagination and underscoring the scientific nature of its reasoning style, as well as the methodologies used to gather evidence for legal inquiries. Finally, Section 3 further substantiates the epistemological role of profiling by exploring the potential benefits of integrating bias in profiling from a feminist perspective. Through this analysis, we aim to highlight the significance and validity of profiling as an essential tool in contemporary legal inquiries. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is a non-standard but theoretically important notion of “veridicality”, on which perception is only veridical if it does not scramble the objective physical structure of the environment. I argue that non-veridicality in this sense is compatible with veridicality in more familiar senses, and motivate the importance of the notion. For example, I think a certain kind of realism about the scientific enterprise (that it can uncover nature’s natural structure by inference from the manifest image), assumes (...) that perception is veridical in this sense. I think the best reconstruction of Hoffman, Singh and Prakah’s “Interface Theory” is as the view that perception is non-veridical in this non-standard sense – a view that I think is reasonably understood as a kind of transcendental idealism, because it makes the objective structure of the world unknowable to us. They offer debunking arguments against perceptual veridicality (in this special sense). I respond to these arguments, and sketch a realist alternative. (shrink)

A topic of recent interest involves the nature of theistic faith, and in particular, the boundaries of such faith. For example, philosophers have taken opposing positions on whether atheists and agnostics can have theistic faith. I consider a related question: whether anti-theists, who think God’s existence would be a bad thing, can have faith. I argue for a negative answer, although with several caveats.

Kaplan (1989a) insists that natural languages do not contain displacing devices that operate on character—such displacing devices are called monsters. This thesis has recently faced various empirical challenges (e.g., Schlenker 2003; Anand and Nevins 2004). In this note, the thesis is challenged on grounds of a more theoretical nature. It is argued that the standard compositional semantics of variable binding employs monstrous operations. As a dramatic first example, Kaplan’s formal language, the Logic of Demonstratives, is shown to contain monsters. For (...) similar reasons, the orthodox lambda-calculus-based semantics for variable binding is argued to be monstrous. This technical point promises to provide some far-reaching implications for our understanding of semantic theory and content. The theoretical upshot of the discussion is at least threefold: (i) the Kaplanian thesis that “directly referential” terms are not shiftable/bindable is unmotivated, (ii) since monsters operate on something distinct from the assertoric content of their operands, we must distinguish ingredient sense from assertoric content (cf. Dummett 1973; Evans 1979; Stanley 1997), and (iii) since the case of variable binding provides a paradigm of semantic shift that differs from the other types, it is plausible to think that indexicals—which are standardly treated by means of the assignment function—might undergo the same kind of shift. (shrink)