A Priori Quotes

“Among all the occurrences possible in the universe the a priori probability of any particular one of them verges upon zero. Yet the universe exists; particular events must take place in it, the probability of which (before the event) was infinitesimal. At the present time we have no legitimate grounds for either asserting or denying that life got off to but a single start on earth, and that, as a consequence, before it appeared its chances of occurring were next to nil. ... Destiny is written concurrently with the event, not prior to it... The universe was not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man. Our number came up in the Monte Carlo game. Is it surprising that, like the person who has just made a million at the casino, we should feel strange and a little unreal?”
― Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology

“If it be true that there can be no metaphysics transcending human reason, it is no less true that there can be no empirical knowledge that is not already caught and limited by the a priori structure of cognition.”
― C.G. Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious

“That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how should the faculty of knowledge be called into activity, if not by objects which affect our senses and which, on the one hand, produce representations by themselves or on the other, rouse the activity of our understanding to compare, connect, or separate them and thus to convert the raw material of our sensible impressions into knowledge of objects, which we call experience? With respect to time, therefore, no knowledge within us is antecedent to experience, but all knowledge begins with it.
But though all our knowledge begins with experience, is does not follow that it all arises from experience. For it is quite possible that even our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we perceive through impressions, and of that which our own faculty of knowledge (incited by sense impressions) supplies from itself, a supplement which we do not distinguish from that raw material until long practice and rendered us capable of separating one from the other.
It is therefore a question which deserves at least closer investigation and cannot be disposed of at first sight: Whether there is any knowledge independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses? Such knowledge is called 'a priori' and is distinguished from empirical knowledge, which has its source 'a posteriori', that is, in experience...”
― Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

“It is not very easy to see,” Mircea Eliade writes, “how the discovery that the primal laws of geometry were due to the empirical necessities of the irrigation of the Nile Delta can have any bearing on the validity or otherwise of those laws.” We can argue here in the same way. For it is really no easier to understand how the fact that the first emergence of the idea of God may possibly have been provoked by a particular spectacle, or have been linked to a particular experience of a sensible nature, could affect the validity of the idea itself. In each case the problem of its birth from experience and the problem of its essence or validity are distinct. The problems of surveying no more engendered geometry than the experience of storm and sky engendered the idea of God. He important thing is to consider the idea in itself; not the occasion of its birth, but its inner constitution. If the idea of God in the mind of man is real, then no fact accessible to history or psychology or sociology, or to any other scientific discipline, can really be its generating cause.”
― Henri de Lubac, The Discovery of God

“The fundamental basis by which the court’s decision might be made is, in itself, imperfect and subject to contradictions. There is very little consideration given to a priori knowledge regarding the circumstances being presented and as a result, arguments must be made empirically, under the assumption that assumptions themselves are, in fact, likely to give way to specious reasoning...Decisions must be made meticulously and according to specific, yet immeasurable criteria that can only be further manipulated by any cunning lawyer with the ability to make emotional pleas based on a requisite amount of inconsequential evidence to affect a decision beneficial to his clients. And so, in this respect, the law is capable of proving nothing except that its absurd attention to detail is really a kind of a façade meant to cover up the fact that a truly logical and just way to deal with such matters has not yet been devised. And the absence of adequate definition to its principles has given way to a kind of apathy among the men employed by the courts, who want nothing more now than to make a living for themselves and their families and not work themselves into too much of a frenzy about how little can be changed through their own initiative. Thus things aren’t likely to.”
― Ashim Shanker, Don't Forget to Breathe

“The “Empirical Fallacy” is that experience is knowledge when in fact it is just experience. A person could have infinite experiences and literally know nothing about what reality is. A person could perform a trillion observations and have no more clue about what reality is than someone performing divination in the ancient world, or a cockroach. It is not perceptualism that has led to humanity’s body of knowledge, it is conceptualism. Humanity doesn’t perceive better today, it conceives better, and that is purely thanks to mathematics, reason and logic.”
― Thomas Stark, Tractatus Logico-Mathematicus: How Mathematics Explains Reality

“a priori knowledge such as mathematics or logic is general, whereas all experience is particular.”
― Bertrand Russell

“Yann LeCun's strategy provides a good example of a much more general notion: the exploitation of innate knowledge. Convolutional neural networks learn better and faster than other types of neural networks because they do not learn everything. They incorporate, in their very architecture, a strong hypothesis: what I learn in one place can be generalized everywhere else.

The main problem with image recognition is invariance: I have to recognize an object, whatever its position and size, even if it moves to the right or left, farther or closer. It is a challenge, but it is also a very strong constraint: I can expect the very same clues to help me recognize a face anywhere in space. By replicating the same algorithm everywhere, convolutional networks effectively exploit this constraint: they integrate it into their very structure. Innately, prior to any learning, the system already “knows” this key property of the visual world. It does not learn invariance, but assumes it a priori and uses it to reduce the learning space-clever indeed!”
― Stanislas Dehaene, How We Learn: Why Brains Learn Better Than Any Machine . . . for Now

“Our brain is therefore not simply passively subjected to sensory inputs. From the get-go, it already possesses a set of abstract hypotheses, an accumulated wisdom that emerged through the sift of Darwinian evolution and which it now projects onto the outside world. Not all scientists agree with this idea, but I consider it a central point: the naive empiricist philosophy underlying many of today's artificial neural networks is wrong. It is simply not true that we are born with completely disorganized circuits devoid of any knowledge, which later receive the imprint of their environment. Learning, in man and machine, always starts from a set of a priori hypotheses, which are projected onto the incoming data, and from which the system selects those that are best suited to the current environment. As Jean-Pierre Changeux stated in his best-selling book Neuronal Man (1985), “To learn is to eliminate.”
― Stanislas Dehaene, How We Learn: Why Brains Learn Better Than Any Machine . . . for Now

“Eu já te amava a priori, eu ainda te amo a posteriori.”
― Filipe Russo, Caro Jovem Adulto

“Perhaps also there are some necessary truths about mind, language, and perception after all, a compendium of superscientific truths awaiting discovery and dissemination by philosophers.

If so, however, one would expect the same to be true of other subjects. For example, one would expect there to be a set of necessary truths about all possible living things; and another set about all possible stars and galaxies; and another set about all possible forms of matter; and so on. One would expect, that is, a significant compendium of a priori knowledge on almost every significant subject: space, time, motion, light, matter, planets, fire, cosmology, life, weather, medicine, and so forth. Given the thousands of years philosophers have had to penetrate these subjects, we might well ask in which books the apodictic fruits of so much a priori labour have been written down.

Put thus bluntly, the question is embarrassing. There is no such accumulated compendium of important a priori truths on any of these topics. And this despite the fact that philosophers have been talking and theorizing with enthusiasm about all of them for over twenty-five centuries. Claims of necessary truth have regularly been made, but empirical refutation has been their most common fate. What has accumulated instead is a rich compendium of a posteriori knowledge, a compendium born of the continuing labours of various subdivisions of earlier philosophy, subdivisions now quite properly identified as sciences. It now seems silly to expect philosophical techniques to reveal important necessary truths about all possible planets, or all possible forms of matter, or all possible living things. But if it is just plain silly to expect this for planets, matter, and life, why should it be sound philosophy to expect it for language, mind, and perception?”
― Paul M. Churchland

“The moral here is that nature and nurture should not be opposed. Pure learning, in the absence of any innate constraints, simply does not exist. Any learning algorithm contains, in one way or another, a set of assumptions about the domain to be learned. Rather than trying to learn everything from scratch, it is much more effective to rely on prior assumptions that clearly delineate the basic laws of the domain that must be explored, and integrate these laws into the very architecture of the system. The more innate assumptions there are, the faster learning is (provided, of course, that these assumptions are correct!). This is universally true. It would be wrong, for example, to think that the AlphaGo Zero software, which trained itself in Go by playing against itself, started from nothing: its initial representation included, among other things, knowledge of the topography and symmetries of the game, which divided the search space by a factor of eight.

Our brain too is molded with assumptions of all kinds. Shortly, we will see that, at birth, babies' brains are already organized and knowledgeable. They know, implicitly, that the world is made of things that move only when pushed, without ever interpenetrating each other (solid objects)—and also that it contains much stranger entities that speak and move by themselves (people). No need to learn these laws: since they are true everywhere humans live, our genome hardwires them into the brain, thus constraining and speeding up learning. Babies do not have to learn everything about the world: their brains are full of innate constraints, and only the specific parameters that vary unpredictably (such as face shape, eye color, tone of voice, and individual tastes of the people around them) remain to be acquired.”
― Stanislas Dehaene, How We Learn: Why Brains Learn Better Than Any Machine . . . for Now

“On the other hand, it is also characteristic of the state of philosophical inquiry today and has been for a long time that, while there has been extensive controversy about whether or not the *a priori* can be known, it has never occurred to the protagonists to ask first what could really have been meant by the fact that a time-determination turns up here and why it must turn up at all. To be sure, as long as we orient ourselves toward the common concept of time we are at an impasse, and negatively it is no less than consistent to deny dogmatically that the *a priori* has anything to do with time. However, time in the sense commonly understood, which is our topic here, is indeed only one derivative, even if legitimate, of the original time, on which the Dasein's ontological constitution is based. *It is only by means of the Temporality of the understanding of Being that it can be explained why the ontological determinations of Being have the character of apriority*. We shall attempt to sketch this briefly, as far as it permits of being done along general lines.

We have just seen that all comportment toward beings already understands Being, and not just incidentally: Being must necessarily be understood precursorily (pre-cecently). The possibility of comportment toward beings demands a precursory understanding of Being, and the possibility of the understanding of Being demands in its turn a precursory projection upon time. But where is the final stage of this demand for ever further precursory conditions? It is temporality itself as the basic constitution of the Dasein. Temporality, due to its horizonal-ecstatic nature, makes possible *at once* the understanding of Being and comportment toward beings; therefore, that which does the enabling as well as the enablings themselves, that is, the possibilities in the Kantian sense, are "temporal," that is to say, Temporal, in their specific interconnection. Because the original determinant of possibility, the origin of possibility itself, is time, time temporalizes itself as the absolutely earliest. *Time is earlier than any possible earlier* of whatever sort, because it is the basic condition for an earlier as such. And because time as the source of all enablings (possibilities) is the earliest, all possibilities as such in their possibility-making function have the character of the earlier. That is to say, they are *a priori*. But, from the fact that time is the earliest in the sense of being the possibility of every earlier and of every *a priori* foundational ordering, it does not follow that time is ontically the first being; nor does it follow that time is forever and eternal, quite apart from the impropriety of calling time a being at all.”

―from_The Basic Problems of Phenomenology_”
― Martin Heidegger

“Thus with the question of the Being of truth and the necessity of presupposing it, just as with the question of the essence of knowledge, an 'ideal subject' has generally been posited. The motive for this, whether explicit or tacit, lies in the requirement that philosophy should have the '*a priori*' as its theme, rather than 'empirical facts' as such. There is some justification for this requirement, though it still needs to be grounded ontologically. Yet is this requirement satisfied by positing an 'ideal subject'? Is not such a subject *a fanciful idealization*? With such a conception have we not missed precisely the *a priori* character of that merely 'factual' subject, Dasein? Is it not an attribute of the *a priori* character of the factical subject (that is, an attribute of Dasein's facticity) that it is in the truth and in untruth equiprimordially?

The ideas of a 'pure "I"' and of a 'consciousness in general' are so far from including the *a priori* character of 'actual' subjectivity that the ontological characters of Dasein's facticity and its state of being are either passed over or not seen at all. Rejection of a 'consciousness in general' does not signify that the *a priori* is negated, any more than the positing of an idealized subject guarantees that Dasein has an *a priori* character grounded upon fact.

Both the contention that there are 'eternal truths' and the jumbling together of Dasein's phenomenally grounded 'ideality' with an idealized absolute subject, belong to those residues of Christian theology within philosophical problematics which have not as yet been radically extruded.

The Being of truth is connected primordially with Dasein. And only because Dasein is as constituted by disclosedness (that is, by understanding), can anything like Being be understood; only so is it possible to understand Being."

―from_Being and Time_. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, p. 272”
― Martin Heidegger

“Certainly, what Kant calls the transcendental reference, experience and object of experience are in a sense present in both opposed views of the nature of the subjective *a-priori*. In both cases the object must 'order itself' according to the rules of the knowing mind or its functions, irrespective of whether the specific function of cognition is based on a systematic construction, synthetization, formation of the object from 'given' sensational material or on a methodical selection-process (suppression, abstraction, disregard) imposed on a self-constituting object. For if the order of selection in which the fulness of the world, as it is in ipseity, reaches man (or a particular kind of man, e.g., a type of racial or cultural unity) is so governed that an object of essence *B* is only given when an object of essence *A* has already been given (if, that is to say, *A* has datum-priority over *B* in order of time―not necessarily in direct succession), then if an object *X* is simultaneously of essence *A* and *B*, everything which is true of *A* must necessarily be true of *X*―not vice versa. For example, if spatiality and extensity have strict perceptual priority over all essential properties of matter and corporeality, geometry must be strictly valid for all possible bodies. But the same principle, the applicability of geometry to all bodies without exception, would still hold good if Kant's doctrine were true―though it denies the very reality of extension and space, and explains the spatial form as merely a subjective aspect of the datum. Thus in both cases the transcendental validity of the so-called *a-priori*, even for the objects of experience, would persist, so that in itself it offers us *no* criterion of choice between one or other *hypothesis*―that which supposes a synthetic addition of the form on the part of the spontaneous mind, or the other, which postulates an ordered selection in conformity with foreknown essences."

―from_On the Eternal in Man_. The Nature of Philosophy, with a new introduction by Graham McAleer”
― Max Scheler

“The whole shtick of scientism revolves around sensory evidence. How many times must it be said that there is no such thing as self-explanatory sensory evidence? All evidence must be interpreted, and the interpretation is not a perceiving activity but a judging activity. The catastrophic error that worshipers of scientism (autistic sensing types) commit is that they privilege perceiving over judging. They believe that perception is the most important thing, and that judgment must be directed to the maximum degree possible at the perception, and minimize and indeed eliminate any reference to anything that has not been perceived. For worshipers of scientism, perception comes first, and judging is secondary, determined by perceiving. That is what empiricism is all about. It claims that all knowledge comes from experience, that there are no innate ideas, and it revolves around synthetic propositions and a posteriori knowledge. Rationalism, by total contrast, asserts that knowledge comes from logical, rational deduction and that innate ideas form the only secure basis for knowledge. It deals with analytic propositions and a priori knowledge.”
― Thomas Stark, Extra Scientiam Nulla Salus: How Science Undermines Reason

“The ultimate cause of matter must be immaterial. The ultimate cause of entropy must be free of entropy. The ultimate cause of time must be outside time. The ultimate cause of space must be outside space. The ultimate cause of temperature must be without temperature. The ultimate cause of physical motion must be without physical motion. Why? Because everything on the left belongs to the temporal and contingent while everything on the right belongs to the eternal and necessary. Only the latter can explain the former. The former cannot explain themselves. The latter belong to the order of eternal truths.”
― Thomas Stark, God Is Mathematics: The Proofs of the Eternal Existence of Mathematics

“Empiricists say, “Where’s your evidence?” In fact, our evidence is every piece of evidence ever gathered by science. Our disagreement is not with the evidence, it’s with the interpretation of the evidence. Every scientist interprets the evidence via the Meta Paradigm of empiricism and materialism, leading to wholly bizarre and irrational conclusions. The correct way to interpret the evidence is via rationalism and idealism. When has any scientific experiment ever refuted rationalism and idealism and proved the truth of empiricism and materialism? Scientists are so ignorant and philosophically illiterate that they don’t even realize they are engaged in interpretation rather than factuality.”
― Thomas Stark, God Is Mathematics: The Proofs of the Eternal Existence of Mathematics

“What is the eternal, necessary order? It is the order of reason and logic. It is the analytic, a priori order, the conceptual order. It has traditionally been associated with God (religion), but it ought to be associated with mathematics (rationalism). Much of what is said about God in philosophy could equally be said about mathematics. The traditional proofs of the existence of God can easily be repurposed as proofs of the existence of mathematics.”
― Thomas Stark, The Sheldrake Shift: A Critical Evaluation of Morphic Resonance

“All contingent truths (“truths of fact”) must be grounded in eternal, necessary truths (“truths of reason”). Contingent truths cannot explain eternal, necessary truths, but the converse must be true. Existence cannot be grounded in contingency, only in necessity. Science claims that existence is purely accidental, hence entirely contingent. There is no sufficient reason for the “random fluctuations” upon which science bases its entire “philosophy”. Science is completely false at the level of the non-observable: the level of ultimate noumenal truth.”
― Mike Hockney, Richard Dawkins: The Pope of Unreason